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Abstract
We analyse how the size of the middle class has evolved in 26 European countries be-
tween 2004 and 2013. With data from the European Survey on Income and Living Con-
ditions (EU-SILC), we define households with a median equivalised disposable household
income between 75% and 125% to be middle class. We find that in 16 out of 26 countries
the middle class decreases and identify an increase in income polarization in all these
countries, with the exception of Greece. We examine whether changes regarding the
middle class can be attributed to changing household structure, unemployment rates or
redistributive policies. Our results suggest that redistributive policies are most influential
for explaining the change across country groups, whereas the other factors do not seem
to have an impact. However, there is a great variation between countries. Due to govern-
ment transfers and taxes, middle class increased 17 percentage points in Iceland, while
only by 5.3 percentage points in Estonia. Exploring potential explanations for this gap,
we define country groups with similar socio-economic policies and institutions. We ob-
serve that Social-Democratic countries and Central European economies have the biggest,
while Baltic and Mediterranean countries show the smallest middle class. Analysing the
impact of redistributive policies we find considerable differences between country groups
and can show that liberal market economies do most, whereas Baltic countries do least
for their middle class.
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1 Introduction
The aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007 has increased the interest in income and wealth
inequality, as well as the concern about the hollowing out of the middle class. Moreover, the
well-being of the middle class was part of the latest election campaigns in Europe and the
United States. Therefore, this paper will analyse how the size of the middle class has evolved
in 26 European countries between 2004 and 2013. An extensive literature exists, where
numerous studies find a declining middle class.1 The hollowing out of the middle class is asso-
ciated with a more polarized income distribution, as proposed by Foster and Wolfson (2010).
Hence, when there are more lower- and/or upper-income class households and consequently
fewer middle class households. Additionally, the concept of hollowing out can also encompass
a declining income share of the middle class. According to Thewissen et al. (2015), the on-
going debate not merely lies within the realm of scientific research, but has extended to the
political sphere. There, the focus lies on the lack of improved living standard for the middle
strata, as well as on stagnating real incomes in recent decades. The authors further mention
the decline of opportunities, increased insecurity of the middle class and lack of prosperity
for their children.
Scholars and politicians have pointed out the importance of a stable and large middle class.
Birdsall et al. (2000, 1) consider the middle class as "the backbone of both the market econ-
omy and of democracy in most advanced countries". Furthermore, Thewissen et al. (2015)
stress the positive effect on the aggregate demand and the importance for investments on
education and skills of the middle class. Moreover, it has been argued by Rajan (2011) and
Reich (2010) that growing income inequality fuels household debt when lower and middle
income households try to smooth their consumption in times of income fluctuations leading
to greater financial instability.2 The idea that a strong middle class is also vital for democ-
racy and social cohesion is not a new one, it was already put forward by Aristotle (1932).3
He emphasises that political communities administered by a numerous and strong middle
class are favorable over a rule by either one of the two extremes - rule by the poor (extreme
democracy) or rule by the rich (oligarchy). More recently, Barro (1999) finds that democracy
increases with the share of middle-class income. Fukuyama (2012) raises the question in his
essay, whether liberal democracy can survive the decline of the middle class. He postulates
that liberal democracy rests on a middle-class social base, which is being eroded by the cur-
rent form of globalized capitalism.
Thus, based on the outlined considerations it is worthwhile to carefully study the develop-
1For single country analyses see, e.g., Blackburn and Bloom (1985), Rosenthal (1985), Bradbury et al.
(1986), Horrigan and Haugen (1988), Jenkins (1995), Grabka and Frick (2008) or Grabka et al. (2016) For
cross-country analysis see, e.g., or Deininger and Squire (1996), Pressman (2007), Foster and Wolfson (2010),
Kharas (2010), Ravallion (2010) or Bigot et al. (2012).
2”In both eras [1920s and 2000s], had the share going to middle class not fallen, middle-class consumers
would not have needed to go as deeply into debt in order to sustain their middle-class lifestyle. Had the rich
received a smaller share, they would not have bid up the prices of speculative assets so high” (Reich, 2010, 25)
3See: Book IV, IX. 6- 8
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ment of the middle class in Europe. With this paper we contribute to the current debate in
several important ways. First, we show how the middle class evolved in Europe between
2004 and 2013 on a country basis. Second, we study to what extent the income distribution
became more polarized across Europe by means of a polarization index, that was proposed by
Wolfson (1994). In their recent paper, Alichi et al. (2016) who examine income polarization
in the United States, emphasize that it is of great importance to study and compute the polar-
ization index also for other countries. Third, we deal with drivers of a changing middle class
based on a framework proposed by Pressman (2007), who analysed the decline of the mid-
dle class investigating structural, macroeconomic and fiscal factors in 11 developed countries
between 1980 and 2000. Last, we illustrate potential causes for the change in middle class
by focussing on variations across different welfare state regimes. To examine these issues, we
use household income data from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) for 26 European countries between 2004 and 2013. In this paper, we define the middle
class as households receiving an income between 75% and 125% of the median equivalised
disposable household income.
Our results underline the findings of Pressman (2007). We show that redistributive policy is
the most important driver for the size of the middle class. The influence of redistributive pol-
icy on the middle class varies significantly between countries and increased its size between
17 percentage points in Iceland and 5.3 percentage points in Estonia. To explain this gap we
cluster countries into groups with similar socio-economic policies and institutions. Using an
approach provided by Aristei and Perugini (2015) to cluster countries with respect to similar
socio-economic policies and institutions, we find that Social-Democratic countries and Cen-
tral European economies have the biggest middle class, whereas the smallest middle class is
found in Baltic and Mediterranean countries. However, the institutional influence tends to
get weaker and a convergence of the size of the middle class across Europe is found in the
data. This is revealed by the decline in the range of the size of the middle class between coun-
try groups, which declined from 13.2 percentage points in 2004 to 10.9 percentage points in
2013. Furthermore, we observe that the effect of governmental redistribution on the size of
the middle class is significantly weaker when considering only household heads younger than
60 years old. Thus, we see that most of governmental redistribution is due to social security
and retirement programs for the elderly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the difficulties of
measuring the middle class. Section 3 describes our data. Our results are discussed in section
4, which is divided into three subsections. First, we give an overview about the development
of the middle class at the European level. In this section we show how many European coun-
tries have experienced a declining middle class and whether there was upward or downward
mobility. In addition, we present the application of the polarization index. We examine the
M-curves, first and second polarization curves of each country according to Foster and Wolf-
son (2010) to ensure that our findings are also valid when other middle class thresholds are
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chosen. Second, we analyse the effect of changing household structure, unemployment rates
and redistributive policy on the size of the middle class. We further examine to what extent
government social security and retirement programs for the elderly alter the size of the mid-
dle class. Third, we present the size and income share of the middle class, as well as the
development of income polarization on a country group level. Moreover, we compare income
polarization and income inequality trends across Europe in recent years. Finally, section 5
summarizes our main findings.
2 Measuring the middle class
Among economists, the middle class is usually defined in terms of income. Economists, as
pointed out by Gornick and Jäntti (2014) study those who belong to the middle of the in-
come distribution, rather than a class in sociological terms.4 Nevertheless, it would be a
neglect to underrate the significance of wealth when studying the middle class. Fessler and
Schürz (2017) point out that it is pivotal to differentiate between middle-class households,
which enjoy securities by means of their own wealth and those which have to rely on the wel-
fare state. In this paper, due to data constraints, we exclusively refer to the middle income
class, when talking about the middle class. Various measurement approaches can be useful
in different contexts. The size of the middle class can be either fixed or varying. When taking
the size of the middle class as fixed, scholars study for instance the three middle quintiles
(Easterly, 2001) or the middle 60 percent (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). According to this
measurement, the size of the middle class cannot - by definition - change over time. Since
we focus on the changing size of the middle class, we use thresholds for defining our subject
of interest. Income thresholds can be either in absolute or relative terms. For developing
countries, an absolute income measure is commonly used to define poverty, as well as the
middle class. For instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) define the middle class for developing
countries as people living on between $2 and $10 a day. Another approach for identifying the
middle class in developing countries is to study the consumption behaviours of individuals
or households instead of income. Ravallion (2010) argues that for high-income countries,
definitions are generally based on relative income, typically referring to the median equiv-
alised income of a country. Owing to the fact that the size of the middle class in European
countries lies at the core of our research, we use a relative income definition for the middle
class. Defining the middle class in relative terms leads us to the problematic issue of defining
4Other disciplines typically go beyond a definition solely based on income. Grabka et al. (2016) mention
other socio-economic factors, such as education, social and occupational status, family background, social net-
works, leisure behaviour or values can be included in defining an income class. According to Burzan (2012)
the society can be divided along vertical inequalities, such as occupation, education and income, as well as
horizontal inequalities, such as gender, age, ethnicity, residential area, lifestyle and values. Moreover, Piketty
(2014) defines the middle class as 40% of the households above the median wealth (P50-P90). Fessler and
Schürz (2017) examine the middle class in Austria according to definitions based on income, consumption and
wealth. The authors find that only 26.6% of households belong to the middle 60% regardless of the definition
(equivalised net income, equivalised consumption or net wealth).
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lower and upper thresholds. Once more, there is a lack of consensus on which thresholds
should be used. A wide variety of definitions exist: Grabka and Frick (2008) and Bigot et al.
(2012) define the middle class as households with an equivalised income between 70% and
150% of the national median income. Other studies, such as Blackburn and Bloom (1985) and
Pew-Research-Center (2015) broadened the definition to 60-225% and 67-200%, respectively.
Bosch and Kalina (2015) and Simonazzi and Barbieri (2016) chose cut-off points of 60% and
200%. Again other scholars study households with an income between 75% and 125%, when
talking about the middle class (Birdsall et al., 2000; Pressman, 2007; Thurow, 1987). The
enumeration should highlight the great variation in the literature and the difficulty to choose
thresholds. Nonetheless, according to Ravallion (2010) the literature seems to ”converge“ to
a definition introduced by the seminal work of Thurow (1987), who defines the middle class
between 75% and 125% of the median income. For this research, we decided to follow the
literature and define the middle class as households living on between 75% and 125% of the
national median equivalised income. As opposed to defining the lower threshold at 60% of
the median, we add a margin of a quarter of the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Thus, with a lower
threshold of 75% we imply that the middle class is not at immediate risk-of-income-poverty
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). The chosen thresholds permit us to examine the middle
of the income distribution, bearing in mind its inevitable arbitrariness. In section 4.1.2 we
control for our choice of thresholds, by computing M-curves, polarization curves and a polar-
ization index. We find that our findings considering the decline/increase of the middle class
are consistent with the results from the polarization index, with the exception of one country.
3 Data
We usemicro-level cross-sectional data for 26 European countries provided by the EU-SILC be-
tween 2004 and 2013.5 Our main variable of interest is the equivalised disposable household
income using the OECD-modified scale, which assumes scale effects in the living standard.
The scale was first proposed by Hagenaars et al. (1994) and assigns a value of 1 to the first
adult in the household, 0.5 to each additional adult member, and 0.3 to each child aged un-
der 14 (OECD, 2013). Following Aristei and Perugini (2015), we assume that households
are the pivotal dimension where decisions of household members such as parenthood, labor
supply, or education are interdependently taken. Therefore, the adoption of a household per-
spective provides a richer informative set than an individual one. If not stated otherwise, we
use disposable income, as defined by Eurostat (2014) to examine the share of middle-class
households. Equivalised disposable income is the total gross household income, diminished
by income tax, social insurance contributions, regular wealth tax and regular inter-household
cash transfer paid after tax. The Canberra Group (UNECE, 2011) emphasizes that disposable
income is the preferred variable when analyzing income distribution since it covers the income
5For the total sample, we changed negative incomes to Zero in 4,634 cases.
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available for a household to consume and save.6 When studying the effect of redistributive
policy, we additionally examine the size of the middle class before taxes and transfers. This
measure is based on equivalised factor income, which comprises gross market incomes, gross
capital incomes, gross old-age benefits and gross unemployment benefits.
To analyse the influence of changing household composition on the size of the middle class,
we use an approach first introduced by Fessler et al. (2014). This approach uses household
strings, which take the household size, age, and gender (for adults) of up to four household
members into account.7 Each household members obtains a two-digit age-gender cell. First,
all household members are arranged by descending age and divided into one of four age
groups (1: below 16, 2: 16 - 24, 3: 35 - 64, 4: above 64). Second the gender cells are
attributed (1 for male, 2 for female and 3 for children). Last, the age-gender cells of each
member are added together to obtain the household string.8 Although the use of EU-SILC
data offers many advantages, such as comparability among European countries, it is worth
mentioning that in-kind benefits are not included. These benefits provided by the govern-
ment, including child care, health, education, etc. vary substantially and have an important
distributional impact across Europe. Aaberge et al. (2013) observe that estimated income
inequality and the estimated share of people at-risk-of-poverty is significantly smaller when
replacing disposable cash income with extended income (i.e. including early childhood ed-
ucation and care, education, health care and long-term care). Owing to these findings, we
presume that a different picture concerning the share of middle-class households across Eu-
rope would emerge when taking in-kinds benefits as extended income into account.
In order to examine the impact of redistributive policy on the size of the middle class in sec-
tion 4.3, we use an approach provided by Aristei and Perugini (2015) to cluster countries
into six groups (see Table A.1). We assume that countries within a group show similar socio-
economic policies and institutions, which enables us to take the institutional dimension of
the size of the middle class into account. The framework of Aristei and Perugini (2015) is
based on the Variety of Capitalism approach, which was initiated by Hall and Soskice (2001),
who distinguish countries between liberal and coordinated market economies. To consider a
broader institutional dimension, this approach is widened by the literature of Coates (2000)
and Amable (2003). Furthermore, the framework embeds literature on post-socialist states
and includes institutional factors.9
— Table A.1 about here —
6Additionally, consumption can also be financed by a reduction of net worth and taking out loans.
7However, for analysing the impact of government social security and retirement programs for the elderly in
section 4.2.4 we define household heads. The household head is defined as the person with the highest income
of at least 18 years of age. When two household members have the same income, the oldest person is chosen
to be the household head.
8For instance, a household consisting of one male (36), one female (33) and two children (9 and 11) have
the following household string: [312231313].
9See, e.g., Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009), Lane (2007), Bohle and Greskovits (2007), and Drahokoupil et al.
(2008).
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4 Results
4.1 The development of the middle class: a European comparison
4.1.1 The size of the middle class and mobility
We start our analysis by examining whether a decline of the middle class in Europe can be
observed in the data. Thus, we calculate the middle class by using equivalised disposable
household income. Table A.2 shows the share of the middle class in each country, including
the European average (weighted10 and unweighted) for 2004 and 2013. Furthermore, we
show the absolute change during this time period in percentage points. It is evident that the
size of the middle class varies considerably across Europe. In 2004, on average (weighted)
38.8% of households could be considered middle class in their respective countries. Turning
to 2013, on average (weighted) a small decline between 2004 and 2013 of 0.9 percentage
points can be noted. The share of middle income households decreased in 16 countries,
whereas it increased in 10 countries. Ireland experiences the most substantial rise, with 6.7
percentage points. The increase in the other countries ranged from 0.3 (Italy) up to 3.1
percentage points (Iceland). Conversely, the largest decline of the middle class is observed
in Germany (8.6 percentage points) followed by Sweden (6.7 percentage points) and Estonia
(5.4 percentage points). We notice significant differences regarding the size of the middle
class among the observed countries. The middle class ranges from around one third (Cyprus,
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and United Kingdom) up to
almost one half (Czech Republic, Iceland, Norway and Slovakia) in 2013.
— Table A.2 about here —
Further, we examine whether the lower income class increases more than the upper in-
come class (downward mobility) or vice versa (upward mobility), when the middle class
declines. Thus, we compute an indicator by dividing the absolute change of the upper class
through the change of the lower class,
∆upperclass
∆lowerclass
. If the middle class is declining and the
indicator is greater than one, we observe upward mobility whereas downward mobility occurs
if the indicator is smaller than one (the same notion in reverse order applies to an increas-
ing middle class). This is done by analysing the changes in households with an equivalised
household income above 125% (upper income class) and below 75% (lower income class) of
the median. The results are shown in Table A.3 and suggest upward mobility in 14 out of 26
countries. In 16 countries where a decline in the middle class could be noted, nine showed
upward and seven downward mobility. In Belgium, for example, the upper class increased
by 1.66 percentage points, whereas its lower class grew by 0.55 percentage points. As the
middle class declines and the ratio between ∆ upper class and ∆ lower class returns a value
of 3.02, Belgium faces upward mobility. However, we cannot conclude an unequivocal trend
of upward and downward mobility regarding a downsizing of the middle class.
10Accounting for the country’s population size
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— Table A.3 about here —
As a next step, we analyse what happens in the 10 countries, where the middle class
increased. Analysing Table A.3, we see that in 5 out of those 10 countries, the middle class
received a larger share from the income bottom than from the top. Consequently, the opposite
is true for the remaining countries. The results can be found in Table A.4, which summarises
our findings by clustering the analysed countries into 4 different groups.
— Table A.4 about here —
4.1.2 Income polarization and the middle class
As discussed in section 2, the choice of lower and upper limits of the middle class is largely
arbitrary. Atkinson and Brandolini (2013) show that changes regarding the size of the mid-
dle class can vary, depending on which cut-offs are applied. In order to validate our findings
concerning the evolution of the middle class, we conduct a robustness check by looking at
M- and polarization curves, as well as by computing a polarization index based on Wolfson
(1994).
We start by computing M-curves, which is a measurement of the mass around the median
income. M-curves allow us to examine whether an income distribution has a larger middle
class than another one, irrespective of the chosen cut-off points. When the M-curve of period
1 always lies above the M-curve of period 2, it follows that the middle class is unambiguously
larger in period 1 than in period 2, no matter which thresholds are chosen to define the mid-
dle class. Figure A.1 shows the M-curve for Germany. One can clearly see that the M-curve of
2004 lies above the M-curve of 2013, indicating that the middle class of 2013 is unambigu-
ously smaller in comparison to 9 years earlier. No such straightforward conclusions can be
inferred when the M-curves cross. However, if crossings occur, it is useful to examine the loca-
tion of crossings. For our purpose, we do not consider it to be problematic when the M-curves
cross below 0.6 of the normalized income, which translates into the poverty line of below 60%
of the median income. This argument lies on the premise that those living below the poverty
threshold are not categorized as middle class.11 Additional two lines are demarcated at 0.8
and 1.2 in Figure A.1. Since the most narrow definition of the middle class determine the
cut-off points at 80% and 120% of the median income12, any crossings between the two lines
are negligible. When the curves lie on top of each other or slightly above each other in one
half, it is pivotal to look at the other half to examine whether the middle class unambiguously
increases or decreases. We find that in our sample, the middle class of 2013 compared to
2004 is unambiguously smaller in 9 countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Luxembourg, Sweden and Slovenia). The middle class unambiguously increased in
11Cf. Ravallion (2010)
12Bosch and Kalina (2015) differentiate between the lower (60% -<80%), middle (80% -<120%) and upper
(120% - <200%) middle class
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5 countries (Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Portugal and United Kingdom). No such state-
ment can be made in the case of the remaining 12 countries, due to the fact that the M-curves
of the two years cross.
One possible cause of a declining middle class can be a rise in income polarization. A more
polarized income distribution can be attributed to two trends: increased spread and/or in-
creased bipolarity. An increased spread occurs when the rich become richer, whilst the poor
become poorer. The income distribution can also get more polarized by becoming more bipo-
lar, i.e. when the poles become more defined. The first degree of polarization measures the
spread, which is linked to the M-curves. The spread measures the length of the median nor-
malized income space related to a given middle-class population range. For instance, when
examining the middle 60%, the spread is computed by subtracting the normalized income
of the household at the 20th percentile from the normalized income of the household at the
80th percentile. There is an increase of polarization when a larger income spread is needed
in order to capture a predefined population range (in our example, the middle 60%). Thus,
fewer persons/households are located around the median. We can conclude that income dis-
tribution in period 1 has an unambiguously smaller spread, when the first degree polarization
curve of period 1 is always located below the curve of period 2 and the curves do not cross.
A smaller spread translates into a higher concentration of incomes near the middle and thus
a larger middle class. Figure A.1 depicts the first polarization curves for Germany in 2004
and 2013. The polarization curves confirm our findings from the M-curves. The first polar-
ization curve of 2013 is always above the one of 2004. Consequently, the spread in 2013 is
unambiguously larger than in 2004, indicating a smaller middle class in 2013 for any cut-off
points. Figure A.1 further shows the example for the most narrow definition of 80% up to
120%, which translates into a spread of 0.2 from the normalized median income. It is evident
from the figure, that the size of the middle class decreased in Germany. Again, one has to be
careful if and where curves cross. In Europe, the spread unambiguously increased in 9 and
decreased in 5 countries. The curves cross in 12 countries, making it impossible to come to
an unambiguous conclusion.
The income distribution can also become more polarized when bipolarity increases. This is
measured by the second degree polarization curve, which is the area under the first degree
polarization curve. Both polarization curves account for an increased spread, whereas the
second degree polarization curve additionally is sensitive to bipolarity. To derive the second
degree polarization curves, income spreads from the middle to the top and from the middle
to the bottom are accumulated. The curve provides insights on the average distance to the
median for every middle class in any income distribution. When the second degree polariza-
tion curve of period 1 is located below the curve of period 2, then the income distribution
of period 1 is less polarized than in period 2. The example of Germany in Figure A.1 pro-
vides evidence that the income distribution of 2013 is unambiguously more polarized than in
2004. The income distributions across Europe became unambiguously more polarized in 11
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countries, whereas income polarization unambiguously decreased in 7 European countries.
For the remaining countries, no such conclusions can be derived, because the second degree
polarization curves cross.
The specific case of Greece has to be emphasized: first, it is worth pointing out that due to
the economic crisis the equivalised disposable median income decreased by 14.8% nominally
and by 32.2% in real terms between 2004 and 2013.13 Second, the M-curves show that in
the lower half of the income distribution, the curve of 2004 lies above the one of 2013. The
contrary is true for the upper half of the income distribution. Thus, the lower middle class
decreased, whereas the upper middle class increased. This can be also seen in the first and
second polarization curve, where the spread and cumulative spread is greater in 2013 for the
bottom 50% but smaller for the top 50%.
— Figure A.1 about here —
In addition, we measure income polarization with an index of income polarization pro-
vided by Wolfson (1994), which is 4 times the area beneath the second-degree polarization
curve:
P = 4 ∗

0.5− Income Share of Bottom 50%−
Gini Coefficient
2

∗

Mean income
Median income

The polarization index ranges from 0 (no polarity) to 100 (bipolarity) and allows us to
rank income polarization across countries and time. A higher polarization index is associated
with a smaller middle class. It is worth pointing out that the polarization index does not
indicate whether any crossings of the polarization curves occur.14 Consequently, it may well
be the case that although the polarization index increases, the middle class of the first period
is not unambiguously smaller than the one from the second period. In Europe, the income
polarization increased from 2004 to 2013 in 15 countries and decreased in 11 countries, as
shown in Table A.9. A rise of the polarization index is accompanied by a downsizing of the
middle class (defined as 75% - 125% of the disposable equivalised median income) and vice
versa, with Greece being the only exception. In Greece the polarization index decreased as
well as the size of the middle class.
13Nominal equivalised disposable median increased in all other countries, except for Iceland, which experi-
enced a decline of the median income by 5.6%. In real terms, the median also decreased in Cyprus (-8.3%),
Hungary (-11.6%), Ireland (-4.2%), Iceland (-47.0%), Italy (-7.0%), Luxembourg (-3.5%), Portugal (-0.8%) and
United Kingdom (-12.8%).
14Similarly, the Gini index does not provide any information, whether the Lorenz curves of two distributions
cross.
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4.2 The drivers of a changing middle class
To identify drivers of a declining middle class, this section analyses the effects of household
structure and unemployment rates. Moreover, we will examine the impact of redistributive
policy, hence the difference between disposable and factor household income. Last, we will
analyse whether the size of the middle class changes substantially when only non-elderly
households are taken into account. That specific social-group is of high interest because it
allows us to analyse the impact of government social security and retirement programs for
the elderly on the size of the middle class.
4.2.1 Household composition
Table A.5 shows the size of the middle class accounting for household type fixed effects. To
analyse the effect of changing household composition on the size of the middle class, we
standardize the different household structures across countries using an approach introduced
by Fessler et al. (2014). This approach considers the number of household members and takes
all possible combinations of age and gender into account. We undertake a counterfactual
analysis, where we assume that the household composition does not change and is fixed in
2004. Thus, we see howmuch the middle class would have changed between 2004 and 2013,
if we assume that the household composition did not change after 2004. Following Pressman
(2007) we first assume that the size of the middle class is the sum of the weighted average
of each household type, belonging to the middle class. Based on these weighted averages we
then compute the share of the middle class in 2013. We cannot observe what the size of the
middle class would have been in 2013 with a constant household composition of 2004, since
the household composition changed. Therefore, this analysis is referred to as counterfactual.
The counterfactual anaysis shows that, on average, changing household structures do not
account for changing middle class share. As can be seen from Table A.5, the weighted average
is -0.9 percentage points for the actual and -1 percentage point for the counterfactual change
of the size of the middle class. On a country level, we observe the two most significant results
in Cyprus and Norway. For the latter we see that with a constant household type composition
the middle class would only increase 0.1 percentage point compared to an increase of 0.9
percentage points between 2004 and 2013. Moreover, assuming a constant household type
composition shows that the middle class in Cyprus would only decrease by 0.4 percentage
points compared to a decrease of 1.3 percentage points. Thus, we see that the increase of the
middle class in these countries is largely affected by changes in the household composition.
— Table A.5 about here —
4.2.2 Unemployment rate
One possible macroeconomic channel, which might be responsible for a declining middle
class, is rising unemployment. We follow the assumption of Pressman (2007) who argues
11
that declining unemployment rates lead to more people in employment and higher income.
Thus, we assume that if the unemployment rate decreases, more low income households are
able to move to the middle class. In Table A.6, the change of the unemployment rate and
the middle class can be seen. If macroeconomic factors have an impact on the middle class,
we would expect that a rising unemployment rate will lead to a declining size of the middle
class, and vice versa. However, the results show little evidence that the unemployment rate
affects the size of the middle class. On the aggregate level (weighted), unemployment rose by
1 percentage point, while the middle class decreased by 0.9 percentage points between 2004
and 2013. Moreover, the correlation-coefficient shows no significant correlation between the
unemployment rate and the share of middle-class households.
At the country level, in 11 out of 26 countries an increase in the unemployment rate is ac-
companied with a decrease in the size of the middle class. Merely 4 out of 26 countries show
a decline in the unemployment rate and an increase in the size of their middle class. More-
over, one country had no change in the unemployment rate but its middle class decreased.
In 4 countries we observe a decline of the unemployment and the middle class at the same
time. In the remaining 6 countries the opposite holds true. Hence, we find little evidence that
changes in the middle class can be understood by changing unemployment rates.
— Table A.6 about here —
4.2.3 Redistributive policy
To analyse the effect of redistributive policy, we examine the size of the middle class, defined
as households with a factor income between 75% and 125% of the median factor income
in Table A.7.15 Looking at the results it can be noted that, as expected, in all countries the
middle class would be significantly smaller without governmental redistribution. On average
(weighted), the middle class would have been 9.8 percentage points smaller in 2013 based on
factor income. Between countries the influence of government spending and taxes on the size
of the middle class varies significantly. In Iceland the middle class would have been around 17
percentage points smaller, whereas the difference in Estonia only amounts to 5.3 percentage
points. The result shows the vast impact of redistributive policy on the income distribution,
size of the middle class and the variation across European countries.
Furthermore, comparing Table A.7 with Table A.2, we see that, in 10 out of 26 countries,
redistributive policy mitigated the middle class decline/increase. In Norway, for instance, the
middle class rose by 0.9 percentage points after taxes and transfers. The increase based on
factor income would have amounted to 3.9 percentage points. Moreover, in Austria, Cyprus
and Spain we see that the middle class based on factor incomewould have shrunk significantly
more than based on disposable income.
We would expect that when the middle class based on factor income increases, that the middle
15Factor income comprises gross market incomes, capital incomes, old-age benefits and unemployment ben-
efits.
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class based on disposable, also increases. Evidence suggests that this is not always the case.
In 6 countries the middle class would have increased in terms of factor income, but decreased
with respect to disposable income. For instance, the middle class in Latvia declined by 2.1
percentage points based on disposable income, but increased by 2.2 percentage points based
on factor income. In other cases, the rise of the middle class was more pronounced in terms of
factor income than in disposable incomes. Still other examples indicate that also the decline
can be more visible regarding the disposable income than factor incomes. In Germany, the fall
of the middle class amounts to 8.6 percentage points, when the disposable income definition
is used, whereas the decline amounts to 6.8 percentage points otherwise. This shows that
redistributive policy can affect the evolution of the middle class in a positive but also in a
negative way. The significance of redistributive policy should be highlighted. However, no
clear direction becomes evident from our data when trying to explain the changing size of
the middle class over time. Still, it is worthwhile keeping in mind that taxes and transfers
unambiguously increase the share of middle class households.
— Table A.7 about here —
4.2.4 The non-elderly middle class
Table A.8 helps us to establish the significance of government social security and retirement
programs for the elderly on the difference between the size of the middle class before and
after government interference. Factor income is assumed to be low for the elderly because
they are less likely to be in employment. Most elderly persons receive a large share of their
income out of government transfers. Owing to this reason, we now only examine the redis-
tributive effects on a subsample for non-elderly persons. Thus, we calculate the middle class
based only on households which have household heads younger than 60 years old.
In Table A.8 columns 2, 3 and 4 analyse the development of the non-elderly middle class for
disposable income. On average (weighted) themiddle class was 38.7% in 2004 and decreased
by 2.1 percentage points by 2013. Therefore, when only considering non-elderly households
the decline in the middle class is more than twice as much as for the original sample. The
most significant decrease of the middle class was similar to the initial sample: Germany (8
percentage points) is followed by Cyprus (6.7 percentage points) and Sweden (6.4 percent-
age points).
Analysing column 5, 6 and 7 shows the results for non-elderly households when only con-
sidering factor income. In 2013, without redistributive policy the non-elderly middle class
decreased on average (weighted) by 7 percentage points, which is significantly lower than if
we consider all households (9.8 percentage points). Thus, we see that the effect of govern-
mental redistribution is significantly higher when elderly are taken into account.
In 24 out of 26 countries we find that governmental redistribution is lower for non-elderly
households than for the overall sample. The most distinct result is obtained for Slovakia,
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where the redistributional effect between all households (14.6 percentage points) and non-
elderly households (5.8 percentage points) is 8.8 percentage points. Only for Ireland and
Sweden we find that redistributional effects are lower when the elderly are included into the
analysis. Therefore, we can conclude that governmental social security and retirement pro-
grams for the elderly are an important driver for the size of the middle class.
Furthermore, between 2004 and 2013 the non-elderly middle class regarding factor income
declined on average (weighted) by around 2.3 percentage points. It shrunk most significantly
in Cyprus (11.4 percentage points) and Spain (9.5 percentage points). Moreover, in 14 out of
26 countries, redistributive policy mitigated the middle class decline/increase for non-elderly
households. In Sweden redistributive policy had the most negative impact, where the de-
cline of the middle class would have been 0.9 percentage points for factor income but was
6.4 percentage points for disposable income. The other extreme is Ireland, where the middle
class would have decreased by 5.7 percentage points by factor income but increased by 0.5
percentage points by disposable income.
— Table A.8 about here —
4.3 Country groups
We established the link between the importance of redistributive policies and the size of the
middle class. To find out, which country groups are most effective in supporting prosperous
middle class we analyse the influence of welfare state regimes. To do so, we use a framework
provided by Aristei and Perugini (2015). We assume that countries within a country group
(see Table A.1) exhibit similar socio-economic policies and institutions, which enables us to
show which kind of welfare state influences the size of the middle class in a positive/negative
way.
4.3.1 The size of the middle class
Figure A.2(a) shows that the size of the middle class (disposable income) varies significantly
when clustering countries into country groups. After weighting according to the population
size, in 2013 the largest middle class can be observed in the Social-Democratic countries
(SDC) and Continental European economies (CEE), whereas the smallest can be observed in
the Baltic countries (BC) and Mediterranean countries (MC). The range between the biggest
and smallest middle class was reduced from 13.2 percentage points in 2004 to 10.9 percent-
age points in 2013. Therefore, a clear convergence regarding the size of the middle class can
be observed. Redistributive policy still has a significant influence on the size of the middle
class, but its effect is beginning to shrink. Moreover, it is interesting that the middle class only
increased in the liberal market economies (LME) (2.8 percentage points), whereas in all other
country groups the middle class decreased. The most significant decrease can be observed in
the SDC (4.2 percentage points).
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Analysing the evolution of the middle class based on factor income the picture in Figure A.2(b)
is slightly different. In 2013, the biggest middle class can still be found in SDC and CEE, whilst
the smallest middle class now can be observed in the LME. Furthermore, the middle class in
the MC decreased steadily and shrunk by 3.3 percentage points between 2004 and 2013.
However, based on factor income no significant convergence regarding the size of the middle
class can be found. The range between the smallest and biggest middle class decreased only 2
percentage points between 2004 and 2013. Similar results are found for the evolution of the
middle class based on factor income in Figure A.2(b), except that the smallest middle class
now can be observed in the LME.
Figure A.2(c) refers to the impact of redistributive policy on the size of the middle class.
Comparing the size of the middle class regarding disposable and factor income, we show
the extent to which the middle class changed due to governmental influence. In 2004, re-
distributive policy was most successful in SDC where the government increased the middle
class by 14.6 percentage points. MC performed worst and increased their middle class only
by 4.4 percentage points. Between 2004 and 2013 the situation changed considerably. SDC
worsened their positive impact on the middle class (-3.9 percentage points), while LME (+1.6
percentage points) and MC (+3 percentage points) significantly increased their influence. As
a consequence, a different picture emerges for 2013. Now the LME perform best (+12.9
percentage points), while the poorest performance is observed in the BC (+6.4 percentage
points). Finally, we observe a convergence in terms of the middle class and a reduction of
redistribution towards the middle class across Europe.
— Figure A.2 about here —
4.3.2 The income share of the middle class
Focusing only on the share of households belonging to the middle class, leaves out the im-
portant aspect of how large the share of total income going to the middle class effectively is.
It may well be the case that the size of the middle class remains constant, while the income
share of the middle strata falls. Figure A.3(a) shows the development of the income share
(disposable income) of the middle class per country group from 2004 to 2013.16 The country
group patterns for the income share of the middle class are similar to the size of the middle
class shown in Figure A.2. In SDC the middle class obtains the largest share of total income
with 36.7% in 2013. Conversely, the middle class in the BC only receives 23% of total in-
come. The development between 2004 and 2013 shows that the income share of the middle
class declined most in the SDC (4 percentage points), whereas LME show the largest rise of
their income share (3.4 percentage points). Looking at the share of total factor income, as
shown in Figure A.3(b), a similar impression emerges. SDC still obtain the largest income
16For calculating the income share of the middle class we leave out negative incomes.
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share of their middle class (26.8%) and BC the smallest (16.8%). However, the development
between 2004 and 2013 shows an interesting result. The income share of the MC middle
class lost 3.8 percentage points, whereas it increased strongest by 1.2 percentage points in
the LME. In general we see a highly significant correlation between the size of the middle
class and its total income share.17 Figure A.3(c) displays how much governmental influence
changed the income share of the middle class per country group between 2004 and 2013.
This is measured by the difference between the income share of the middle class based on
disposable income (Figure A.3(a)) and the income share of the middle class based on factor
income (Figure A.3(b)).18 Thus, we are able to indicate the difference which results due to
government transfers and taxes on the income share of the middle class. In 2004, the impact
of redistributive policy was highest in SDC (13.6 percentage points) and lowest in the MC (3.6
percentage points). The impact of governmental influence on the income share of the middle
class increased considerably in the MC (4.3 percentage points), while it declined significantly
in SDC (3.6 percentage points). Hence, in 2013 the highest effect due to redistributive policy
on the income share of the middle class can be found in LME (11.9 percentage points), while
the BC show the poorest performance (6.2 percentage points).
— Figure A.3 about here —
4.3.3 Income polarization across country groups
When grouping the countries into country groups, the evidence points towards a convergence
of income polarization. The polarization index is lowest in Social-Democratic countries (SDC)
and Continental European economies (CEE) and highest in the Baltic countries (BC). Over-
all income polarization increased in most country-groups. Polarization only decreased in the
liberal market economies (LME) and remained constant in the Mediterranean countries (MC).
— Figure A.4 about here —
Last, we compare polarization with inequality trends across Europe. Alichi et al. (2016)
find that for the U.S. the Gini remained relatively constant since 2000, whereas the polar-
ization index has considerably increased since then. According to their findings for the U.S.
they reason that the decline of the middle class in recent years is more worrisome than over-
all inequality. In order to examine the evolution of the two measures, we take the Gini and
polarization index of the 26 countries and compute the weighted average, based on the pop-
ulation size of the respective countries. For Europe, we find that between 2004 and 2005 the
Gini index declined whereas the polarization index slightly increased. Since 2005 the Gini
17For 2013: Correlation value = 0.99, p-value = 0.0001741
18It is worth noting that we do not calculate how much the middle class, defined as disposable income gains
through governmental redistribution, but how much the income share varies depending on whether the middle
class definition is based on disposable or factor income.
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and the polarization index follow a similar pattern: up to the crisis before 2007 both indices
increased, followed by a decline thereafter until 2011. After the recovery from the crisis both
indices started to rise again. These trends are illustrated in Figure A.5(a). In Figure A.5(b)
the starting point 2004 is taken as the base year (Index = 100). Again, we note that the
two indices follow largely the same trend, except for the first year. However, we observe that
the polarization index increased by 2,7% between 2004 and 2013, whereas the Gini index
in 2013 is close to the base year.19 We conduct the same analysis on a country group level.
The results are illustrated in Figure A.6. We find that again the patterns are relatively similar
at a country group level, as depicted in Figure A.6(a). By closely examining Figure A.6(b),
we note that both Gini and polarization increased notably in SDC and CEE. In contrast, in
BC and Eastern European countries (EEC) the Gini decreased while polarization increased.
LME differ from the other country groups, due to the fact that a decline in both indices can
be noted. In MC both indices declined until 2007 and rose afterwards. By 2013 the Gini and
polarization index in MC reached the level of 2004 again.20
— Figure A.5 about here —
— Figure A.6 about here —
To summarise, income polarization increased in those countries, where we find a declining
middle class (with the exception of Greece). Across all 26 European countries, we observe
that on average, the polarization index increased slightly more than the Gini coefficient. This
holds also true for all country groups, except for the MC, where income inequality increased
more than income polarization. Thus, our results suggest that, the increase in polarization
may be more worrisome than inequality.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we use EU-SILC cross-sectional data to analyse how the middle class evolved
in 26 European countries between 2004 and 2013. We follow the literature by defining the
middle class as any household with 75% to 125% of national equivalised disposable median
household income.
We found that middle class has decreased in 16 out of 26 countries and identified no un-
ambiguous trend regarding upward or downward mobility. Ireland experienced the most
substantial increase, with 6.7 percentage points, while the largest decline occurred in Ger-
many, with 8.6 percentage points.
19As a sensitivity analysis, we take 2005 as base year, as opposed to 2004. We see that overall the patterns of
the two indices are very similar. The Gini coefficient increased by 1.1%, whilst the rise of the polarization index
amounts to 2.4%.
20Again, we conduct the same analysis by taking 2005 as base year. The results only differ for MC and BC.
In MC both indices are slightly higher in 2013 than in 2005. Polarization in BC reached the same level in 2013
as 2005, whereas a decline of the Gini can be noted. In the remaining country groups, the general observations
are similar when taking 2004 or 2005 as base year.
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Analysing potential drivers of a declining middle class we have found no significant results
for structural changes of the household composition and the impact of a rising unemploy-
ment rate. Our results identify redistributive policy as the most important factor for the size
of the middle class. Moreover, we see that for non-elderly households the effect of govern-
mental redistribution is significantly weaker. Therefore, we find that a significant part of
governmental redistribution is due to social security and retirement programs for the elderly.
However, the impact of redistributive policy on the middle class varies significantly between
countries. Due to government transfers and taxes, the middle class increased 17 percentage
points in Iceland, while it only rose by 5.3 percentage points in Estonia. Exploring poten-
tial explanations for this gap, we define country groups with similar socio-economic policies
and institutions. We see that Social-Democratic countries and Central European economies
have the biggest, while Baltic and Mediterranean countries have the smallest middle class.
Therefore, we conclude that institutional characteristics of Social-Democratic countries such
as universal benefits, the aim of achieving full-employment, progressive pecuniary benefits
(except for family allowance) tend to be beneficial for the size of the middle class. Moreover,
the Central European economies, which are characterized by the importance of social insur-
ance and monetary benefits, support the climate for a prosperous middle class.21 However, on
a country-group basis between 2004 and 2013 a clear convergence in the size of the middle
class can be observed and the range between biggest and smallest middle class was reduced
from 13.2 to 10.9 percentage points.
Analysing the impact of redistributive policy on the middle class, by comparing its size regard-
ing disposable and factor income, we found interesting results. Social-Democratic countries
and Central European economies increased their middle class due to governmental measures
by around 10.5 percentage points, while Baltic and Mediterranean countries show the poor-
est performance. Considering the size of the middle class, these results reflect an expected
outcome. The performance of liberal market economies, which did most for their middle class
and increased its size due to governmental measures by 12.9 percentage points is worth un-
derlining. This unexpected outcome is striking, because according to Korpi and Palme (1998),
liberal market economies are characterised by a high dependency on private welfare organi-
zation and mean-tested benefits and are therefore assumed to produce larger inequalities.
Last, our evidence points towards a rising income polarization across Europe, which is ac-
companied by a downsizing of the middle class. In 15 out 26 countries income polarization
increased, most notably in Germany with 5.1 percentage points. On the country-group level,
income polarization appears to be converging across Europe. Polarization only decreased in
liberal market economies, remained constant in Mediterranean countries, whereas it rose in
all other country groups. Comparing the trends of the polarization index and the Gini coeffi-
cient, we find that income polarization increased slightly more than income inequality. This
finding suggests that is worthwhile to further study income polarization in-depth, owing to
21For more information about institutional characteristics of Social-Democratic and Central European
economies see Esping-Andersen and Myles (2011)
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the fact that it has substantial implications for the middle class and its well-being.
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A Tables and Figures
TABLE A.1 — Country groups
Country Groups Abbra Countries
Liberal market economies LME Iceland, Ireland, United Kingdom
Continental European economies CEE Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Norway, The
Netherlands, Luxembourg
Social-Democratic countries SDC Denmark, Finland, Sweden
Mediterranean countries MC Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal
Eastern European countries EEC The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia
Baltic countries BC Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia
Notes: aAbbreviations
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TABLE A.2 — Middle class house-
holds as percentage of all households
Country 2004 2013 ∆ %a
AT 43.2 41.9 -1.3
BE 40.9 38.7 -2.2
CY 34.6 33.3 -1.3
CZ 46.9 49.4 2.5
DE 44.6 36.0 -8.6
DK 45.5 43.5 -2.0
EE 32.1 26.7 -5.4
EL 35.1 34.6 -0.5
ES 32.4 31.1 -1.3
FI 42.3 40.1 -2.2
FR 40.8 43.3 2.5
HU 45.8 43.3 -2.5
IE 29.6 36.3 6.7
IS 47.1 50.2 3.1
IT 35.5 35.8 0.3
LT 32.4 32.3 -0.1
LU 43.6 39.1 -4.5
LV 31.4 29.3 -2.1
NL 45.4 45.2 -0.2
NO 46.0 46.9 0.9
PL 35.4 37.9 2.5
PT 32.8 34.2 1.4
SE 46.8 40.1 -6.7
SI 44.7 42.5 -2.2
SK 47.9 48.8 0.9
UK 33.2 35.7 2.5
Averageb 39.9 39.1 -0.8
Averagec 38.8 37.9 -0.9
Notes: a percentage points, b un-
weighted, c weighted
TABLE A.3 — Mobility share
Country ∆% upper classa ∆% lower classa mobility ratio
AT 0.04 1.18 0.03
BE 1.66 0.55 3.02
CY 1.45 -0.16 9.06
CZ -2.16 -0.40 5.40
DE 5.06 3.54 1.43
DK 1.96 0.05 39.20
EE 2.72 2.67 1.02
EL -2.24 2.74 0.82
ES 0.44 0.87 0.51
FI 1.00 1.22 0.82
FR -1.28 -1.23 1.04
HU 1.76 0.73 2.41
IE -1.22 -5.52 0.22
IS 0.11 -3.19 0.03
IT -0.41 0.18 2.28
LT 0.85 -0.72 1.18
LU 1.70 2.78 0.61
LV -0.48 2.63 0.18
NL 0.54 -0.39 1.38
NO -0.19 -0.77 0.25
PL -0.60 -1.91 0.31
PT -0.76 -0.65 1.17
SE 1.70 4.97 0.34
SI 1.16 1.10 1.05
SK 0.28 -1.17 0.24
UK -1.28 -1.23 1.04
Notes: a in percentage points
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TABLE A.4 — Upward and downward mobility
Group Middle Class Mobility Countries
1 Decline Upward Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia
2 Decline Downward Austria, Greece, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, Latvia,
Sweden
3 Increase Upward Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Slovakia
4 Increase Downward Czech Republic, France, Italy, Portugal, The United
Kingdom
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TABLE A.5 — Middle class decline and household
strings from 2004-2013
Country change in per-
centage pointsa
change in per-
centage pointsb
AT -1.3 -1.0
BE -2.2 -2.5
CY -1.3 -0.4
CZ 2.5 2.4
DE -8.6 -8.2
DK -2.0 -2.4
EE -5.4 -5.0
EL -0.5 -0.6
ES -1.3 -1.0
FI -2.2 -2.5
FR 2.5 2.6
HU -2.5 -2.5
IE 6.7 7.7
IS 3.1 3.2
IT 0.3 0.1
LT -0.1 -0.5
LU -4.5 -3.8
LV -2.1 -1.5
NL -0.2 -0.5
NO 0.9 0.1
PL 2.5 1.7
PT 1.4 1.8
SE -6.7 -7.3
SI -2.2 -0.9
SK 0.9 0.6
UK 2.5 2.1
Averagec -0.8 -0.7
Averaged -0.9 -1.0
Notes: a original sample, b constant household strings, c
unweighted, d weighted
TABLE A.6—Changes in the middle class
and unemployment from 2004 to 2013
Country change
unemploymenta
change mid-
dle classa
AT -0.1 -1.3
BE 0.0 -2.2
CY 11.3 -1.3
CZ -1.3 2.5
DE -5.2 -8.6
DK 1.5 -2.0
EE -1.5 -5.4
EL 16.9 -0.5
ES 15.1 -1.3
FI -0.6 -2.2
FR 1.4 2.5
HU 4.1 -2.5
IE 8.6 6.7
IS 2.3 3.1
IT 4.1 0.3
LT 0.9 -0.1
LU 0.9 -4.5
LV 0.2 -2.1
NL 1.6 -0.2
NO -0.8 0.9
PL -8.8 2.5
PT 8.6 1.4
SE 0.6 -6.7
SI 3.8 -2.2
SK -4.2 0.9
UK 2.9 2.5
Averagea 2.4 -0.8
Averageb 1.0 -0.9
Notes:a in percentage points, b unweighted,
c weighted
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TABLE A.7 — Middle class house-
holds based on factor income as per-
centage of all households
Country 2004b 2013 ∆ %a
AT 32.4 29.0 -3.4
BE 26.2 26.8 0.6
CY 29.8 25.1 -4.7
CZ 33.2 34.7 1.5
DE 32.3 25.5 -6.8
DK 28.3 28.7 0.4
EE 24.5 21.4 -3.1
EL 24.8 26.2 1.4
ES 28.1 23.2 -5.0
FI 28.7 27.1 -1.7
FR 34.8 35.0 0.2
HU 34.3 33.8 -0.5
IE 19.8 20.4 0.5
IS 32.4 33.2 0.8
IT 28.6 29.3 0.7
LT 26.3 25.5 -0.7
LU 32.4 29.1 -3.3
LV 20.7 22.9 2.2
NL 28.8 29.0 0.2
NO 28.3 32.2 3.9
PL 28.1 31.3 3.2
PT 25.5 25.0 -0.5
SE 33.2 33.2 0.0
SI 29.0 29.2 0.3
SK 33.1 34.2 1.1
UK 21.8 23.0 1.2
Averagec 28.7 28.2 -0.4
Averaged 29.2 28.1 -1.1
Notes: ain percentage points, b 2005:
ES; 2006: EL, FR, IT, LV and PT, c un-
weighted, d weighted
TABLE A.8 — Non-elderlyd Middle class households
disposable income factor income
Country 2004 2013 ∆ %a 2004 2013 ∆ %a
AT 45.4 42.2 -3.2 34.4 30.8 -3.7
BE 43.4 39.8 -3.6 33.0 31.7 -1.4
CY 41.8 35.1 -6.7 39.8 28.4 -11.4
CZ 44.1 48.3 4.2 37.5 37.5 0.0
DE 43.1 35.0 -8.0 31.0 26.9 -4.0
DK 47.6 41.5 -6.0 36.1 31.2 -4.9
EE 34.7 30.0 -4.7 29.3 26.0 -3.3
EL 34.5 29.7 -4.7 29.3 26.8 -2.5
ES 32.6 28.9 -3.7 34.7 25.2 -9.5
FI 44.8 41.9 -3.0 31.8 30.8 -1.0
FR 42.7 43.6 0.9 37.4 36.8 -0.7
HU 41.1 38.3 -2.7 29.4 30.4 1.0
IE 35.9 36.4 0.5 26.1 20.4 -5.7
IS 49.0 51.0 2.0 35.7 36.0 0.3
IT 35.9 33.7 -2.2 34.1 30.2 -3.9
LT 30.7 30.3 -0.4 25.2 26.0 0.8
LU 40.1 34.8 -5.3 29.6 25.3 -4.3
LV 30.6 31.9 1.3 27.7 27.1 -0.6
NL 44.1 42.5 -1.6 34.5 30.2 -4.3
NO 49.2 46.9 -2.3 31.4 33.6 2.2
PL 30.5 35.4 4.9 24.2 31.5 7.2
PT 34.1 35.1 1.0 29.2 27.7 -1.6
SE 48.9 42.4 -6.4 34.0 33.2 -0.9
SI 48.2 44.7 -3.5 35.4 35.8 0.3
SK 44.7 47.0 2.3 38.2 41.2 3.0
UK 34.3 33.6 -0.7 26.8 24.7 -2.1
Averageb 40.5 38.5 -2.0 32.1 30.2 -2.0
Averagec 38.7 36.6 -2.1 31.9 29.6 -2.3
Notes: a in percentage points, b unweighted, c weighted, d Non-elderly
means that household head is under 60 years old
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TABLE A.9 — Polarization index
Country 2004 2013 ∆ %a
AT 21.5 22.4 0.9
BE 22.6 23.3 0.7
CY 26.8 29.6 2.8
CZ 20.8 19.3 -1.5
DE 20.9 26.0 5.1
DK 20.0 21.9 1.9
EE 31.2 36.4 5.2
EL 28.6 27.2 -1.4
ES 29.1 30.4 1.3
FI 21.7 22.6 0.9
FR 23.1 22.2 -0.9
HU 20.3 22.1 1.8
IE 29.3 27.0 -2.3
IS 19.8 18.8 -1.0
IT 26.6 26.2 -0.4
LT 31.6 31.9 0.3
LU 22.1 23.8 1.7
LV 32.2 33.2 1.0
NL 20.7 21.3 0.6
NO 19.5 19.3 -0.2
PL 28.0 25.7 -2.4
PT 32.5 29.3 -3.2
SE 19.3 22.5 3.2
SI 20.5 22.0 1.5
SK 19.6 19.4 -0.3
UK 29.1 26.8 -2.3
Averageb 24.5 25.5 1.0
Averagec 25.9 26.6 0.7
Notes: a in percentage points, b un-
weighted, c weighted
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FIGURE A.1 — M-curves, First and Second Polarization Curves in Germany
FIGURE A.2 — The evolution of the size of the middle class on country group level
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FIGURE A.3 — The evolution of the income of the middle class on country group level
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FIGURE A.4 — The evolution of the polarization index on country group level
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FIGURE A.5 — The evolution of the Gini and polarization index
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FIGURE A.6 — The evolution of the Gini and polarization index on country group level
20
25
30
35
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Country groups BCCEE
EEC
LME
MC
SDC
Variable Gini Polarization
Gini and Polarization Index, weighted
(a) Index
90
95
100
105
110
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
In
de
x 
(20
04
 = 
10
0)
Country groups BCCEE
EEC
LME
MC
SDC
Variable Gini Polarization
Gini and Polarization Index, weighted
(b) Index (2004=100)
28
FIGURE A.7 — M-curves, First and Second Polarization Curves
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